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1KUZNETS CURVE AND TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION
Begoña Casino
ABSTRACT
This work presents a clearer way of solving the optimisation problem addressed by Selden and Song (1995)
in order to derive the J curve for abatement. The proposed framework is also extended to a two-country model.
Results are consistent, also for the two country case, with empirical evidence that shows a positive relationship
between environmental quality and economic growth for high income levels. A static comparative analysis
con…rms that the smaller the rate of discount and/or the less polluting a technology is, the higher the steady
state stock of capital will be. Moreover, the lack of cooperation is proved to result in smaller e¤orts to abate
emissions.
Keywords: environmental quality, growth, pollution abatement.
RESUMEN
E s t et r a b a j op r e s e n t au n af o r m am á sc l a r ad er e s o l v e re lp r o b l e m ad eo p t i m i z a c i ó np l a n t e a d op o rS e l d e ny
Song (1995) con el …n de obtener la curva en J para las actividades de control de la contaminación. El esquema
propuesto se extiende también a un modelo de dos países. Los resultados son consistentes, también para el
caso de dos países, con la evidencia empírica que muestra una relación positiva entre calidad medioambiental
y crecimiento económico para niveles altos de renta. Un análisis de estática comparativa con…rma que cuanto
menor es la tasa de descuento y/o menos contaminante la tecnología utilizada, mayor será el stock de capital de
estado estacionario. Además, se comprueba que la ausencia de cooperación se traduce en menores esfuerzos por
controlar las emisiones.
Palabras clave: calidad medioambiental, crecimiento económico, control de la contaminación.
JEL Classi…cation: D62, O41, Q20.
21 Introduction
There is a growing empirical literature on how environmental quality changes
at di¤erent income levels. Hettige, Lucas and Wheeler (1992) …nd inverted-
U relationships with economic development for an index of toxic pollutants.
Likewise, Selden and Song (1994) show that per capita emissions of some air
pollutants exhibit a ‘Kuznets’ relationship with per capita GDP. The World
Bank Development Report (1992), Sha…k (1994), Grossman and Krueger
(1995), Holtz-Eakin and Selden (1995) are other works that con…rm this
pattern. Therefore, empirical evidence seems to support the fact that en-
vironmental quality declines in the …rst stages of economic growth and it
improves once economies reach a certain degree of development.
Previous studies on growth and the natural environment consider pol-
lution either as an input (see Bovenberg and Smulders (1996) and Stokey
(1998)) or as a by-product of the economic process (see Forster (1973), Gru-
ver (1976), Ploeg and Withagen (1991), Thavonen and Kuuluvainen (1993),
John and Pecchenino (1994), Selden and Song (1995), Withagen (1995),
Smulders and Gradus (1996) and Hettich (1998)). Thus, improving envi-
ronmental quality requires substitution between pollution and other inputs,
in the former case, and spending money on cleaning up activities to abate
pollution, in the later situation. However, only Gruver (1976), John and
Pecchenino (1992), Selden and Song (1995) and Stokey (1998), explicitly
analyse the transition paths for pollution, abatement e¤orts and develop-
ment.
Selden and Song (1995) use the simplest and earliest framework, Forster’s
model, to derive the J curve for abatement and the inverted U curve for
pollution. An important result is that if pollution is taken into account
3the marginal product of capital net of depreciation no longer equals the
social rate of discount, the economy tends to a lower stock of capital and
consumes at a lower level. In order to account for corner solutions, Selden
and Song (1995) relax the assumption that marginal e¢ciency of abatement
tends to in…nite when expenditures on pollution control are equal to zero
and …nd a J curve for abatement. However, the procedure used to obtain
the optimal saving rate is not clear as one of the …rst order conditions of the
optimisation problem is derived by incorporating the assumption that they
previously relax.
Stokey (1998) presents three models to generate a U shape relationship
between per capita income and environmental quality. Restrictions on the
technology and preferences consistent with the observed hump-shaped re-
lationship between income and pollution levels are de…ned by analysing a
static model. Kuznets relationships are also reproduced by an exogenous
growth model, however, the proposed endogenous growth model requires
that the economy stops growing in order to maintain a constant level of
environmental quality.
Finally, Andreoni and Levinson (1998) analyse a static model with a
commodity that people like but whose consumption generates a bad, pollu-
tion, confronting consumers with a trade-o¤. They show that the pollution-
income relationship behind the environmental Kuznets curve depends on the
technological link between consumption of a desired good and abatement
of its undesirable by-product. These authors conclude that, for a utility
function quasiconcave in consumption and ‘lack’ of pollution, an abatement
technology with increasing returns to scale can explain the inverse U-shape
without introducing growth, released constraints or even externalities.
The present work focuses on Selden and Song’s paper and assumes de-
4creasing returns to scale for cleaning activities. The main objective consists
of proposing, following Ulph (1998), an alternative framework to sort out
Selden and Song’s analysis and extend it to a multi-country case in order
to verify whether the relationship between pollution and national income
changes when pollution is a transboundary problem. Moreover, the analy-
sis of the multi-country case provides an appropriate setting to study the
sources of asymmetries that could explain the observed di¤erences among
abatement e¤orts across countries.
Thus, the model involved will be a Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model with
pollution as a regional reciprocal externality.1 The main di¤erence with
respect to previous literature on Kuznets curve is that the optimisation
problem is decomposed into two stages, the abatement and the accumula-
tion problem. This framework clari…es Selden and Song’s (1995) analysis.
Moreover, it allows to identify the required properties for preferences and
technology to reproduce the observed relationship between pollution and in-
come, in a dynamic context, as Stokey (1998) does through the static model.
Additionally, the analysis is extended to a multi-country case.
The simplest way of analysing interactions is by considering two coun-
tries. In this context, the action of each government a¤ects welfare of the
other and optimal behaviours can be modelled as a di¤erential game where
players may cooperate or, on the contrary, they may act independently.
Results are consistent, also for the two-country case, with empirical stud-
ies that show a J curve for abatement. Furthermore, it is shown that the
smaller the rate of discount and/or the cleaner a technology is, the higher
t h es t e a d ys t a t es t o c ko fc a p i t a lw i l lb e .I ti sa l s op r o v e dt h a te a c hg o v e r n -
1See Barro and Sala-i-Martín (1995) for more details.
5ment has incentives to free ride on the abatement e¤orts of the other and
that externalities due to the lack of cooperation result in smaller e¤orts to
abate emissions. Regarding asymmetries, it is shown that di¤erences in the
rate of discount and the kind of technology used to produce …nal goods and
capital explain di¤erent e¤orts to abate emissions across countries.
The following section states the model. Section 3 sets an alternative
framework to derive the J curve for abatement with respect to Selden and
Song’s (1995) work. Section 4 deals with a two-country model and section
5 concludes the paper.
2T h e M o d e l .
The economic process produces goods and services that provide utility to
consumers and wastes that generate certain disutility. Thus, social welfare
depends positively on consumption and negatively on the damage caused by
pollution.
Assume that the ‡ow of gross bene…ts provided by consumption is an
increasing and concave function, B(ct), and that marginal bene…ts tend to
in…nity as consumption approaches zero. Suppose also that pollution, Pt,i s






(Pt) > 0;8Pt ¸ 0; with D(0) = 0:
Additionally, consider a production function that depends exclusively on
capital and labour. Assuming, for simplicity, a time invariant production
function and a stationary population, the production function can be de…ned
in terms of capital per capita. Suppose then that production is a concave
function of capital per capita, F (kt),w i t hF (0) = 0:
6Since pollution is regarded as a negative externality of production, gross
emissions are positively related to the stock of capital, gt = G(kt).I n
their paper Selden and Song (1995) assume that G
00
(kt) ¸ 0. However, if
emissions are associated with output and output is a concave function of
capital it is not possible that emissions are a convex function of capital and
concavity of G(:); rather than convexity, should be assumed. For simplicity,
we will make the stronger assumption that emissions per unit of output are
constant, gt = G(kt)=µF (kt),w i t hµ>0:2
Moreover, suppose that cleaning up activities, de…ned by the function





(at) < 0;8at ¸ 0 with R(0) = 0: Additionally, following





incorporates corner solutions to Forster’s (1973) model.
Assume also that net emissions, Pt, are additively separable into gross
emissions, gt, minus the reduction in pollution that depends on the amount
of abatement expenditures, at, and ignore (without loss of generality) the
fact that the natural environment absorbs certain amount of acid. That is,
P (kt;a t)=gt ¡ R(at).
Additionally, consider that welfare is additively separable into the ‡ow
of gross bene…ts provided by consumption minus the damage generated by
net emissions of some toxic pollutants.3 Consumption and expenditures on
abatement have to be optimally chosen over time. Thus, considering that
2This assumption is the unique change regarding Selden and Song’s (1995) model and
it does not a¤ect the results concerning the J curve for abatement.
3Following Selden and Song (1995), we are assuming that pollution does not a¤ect the
marginal utility of consumption. Other authors, such as Stokey (1998), make the same
simplifying assumption.
7t h er e p r e s e n t a t i v ec o n s u m e rd i s c o u n t st h ef u t u r ea tar a t e½ and he/she is
altruist in the sense that cares about future generations, the social planner´s





e¡½t fB (ct) ¡ D(Pt)gdt; (1)
s:t:
:
kt = F (kt) ¡ ct ¡ at ¡ ±kt;k (0) = k0 ¸ 0;
Pt = µF (kt) ¡ R(at);a t ¸ 0;
where ± is the rate of depreciation of capital. The optimal solution will solve
the following Hamiltonian:
H (ct;a t;k t;¹ t;¸ t)=B(ct) ¡ D[µF (kt) ¡ R(at)]
+¹t [F (kt) ¡ ±kt ¡ ct ¡ at]+¸tat:
Thus, …rst order conditions for the state and control variables are given




















[µF (k) ¡ R(a)]; (4)
:
k = F (k) ¡ c ¡ a ¡ ±k: (5)
Hence, from (3) we can rewrite (4) as:





















The last term of the above equation does not appear in Forster’s (1973)
paper because he assumes that e¢ciency of cleaning up activities tends to
in…nite as abatement expenditures approaches zero. On the contrary, as
Selden and Song (1995) relax this assumption in order to account for corner
solutions, this term should disappears only for interior solutions, as long as
a>0 implies that ¸ =0 ; but it a¤ects the dynamic of the costate variable
¹ when a =0and ¸>0. As a result, the phase diagram represented by
them is not well de…ned under e E (c;k), that is, for corner solutions, where
e E (c;k) is de…ned making (2) equal to (3) for ¸ = a =0 :
Thus, if a>0, then, ¸ =0 ; and we have a particular case of Forster´s
(1973) model for which the same phase diagram applies. Nevertheless, for
corner solutions, a =0 , taking the time derivative of equation (2) and











































k = F (k) ¡ c ¡ ±k:
The function N (c;k) is identical to that obtained by Forster (1973),


















































Hence, given the assumptions of the model, the sign of Mk depends on








. Therefore, the sign of (7) is ambigu-
ous and the phase diagram could not be the same as that got by Forster
(1973) for values of consumption and capital under e E (c;k). However, for
small values of the parameter µ, that is, for clean technologies, or for a small





, Mk could be positive and we would get Selden and Song´s (1995)
phase diagram. In any case, a resolution of the optimisation problem in two
steps allows to avoid the ambiguity. This alternative method would con-
sist in reducing the control variables to one, consumption plus abatement
expenditures, and represent the phase diagram in terms of capital and cur-
rent expenditure rather than consumption. Then, the optimisation problem
would be solved in two stages: accumulation and pollution control deci-
sions. The former is a dynamic problem that determines the optimal level
of current expenditure and the later is a static problem that establishes the
optimal allocation rule of current expenditure to consumption or abatement.
103 The J-curve for abatement.
This section sets a clearer way of solving the optimisation problem addressed
by Selden and Song in order to derive the J curve for abatement. Firstly,
the abatement problem consists in optimally allocating current expenditure
to consumption or abatement, such that e = c+a.T h u s ,a te a c hp e r i o d ,w e
look for the level of expenditures on abating pollution that maximises net
welfare for a given amount of current expenditure.
max
e¸a¸0
u(a)=B (e ¡ a) ¡ D[g ¡ R(a)]: (8)
Under our assumptions, the maximand in (8) is strictly concave in a.
Thus, the necessary and su¢cient condition for an optimum is:
B
0





This condition implicitly de…nes a function for abatement that depends
on current expenditure and gross emissions.5 Notice that for small values of
consumption the marginal damage generated by emissions might be smaller
than the marginal bene…ts provided by consumption. In that case, if current
expenditure is small enough it would be optimal to spend no resources on
abating pollution.






(0). This condition speci…es
the boundary of a range of values of gross emissions and current expen-
diture for which the solution to the above optimisation problem, de…ned
5The upper bound a = e will never be reached as long as the marginal bene…ts of
consumption tend to in…nite as consumption approaches zero.
11as a¤ = ®(e;g); is zero. As far as marginal damage is an increasing func-
tion in gross emissions, whereas marginal bene…ts decrease as consumption
increases, an increase in gross emissions requires a decrease in current ex-
penditure in order to satisfy the above equality. Therefore, E (g) is a strictly
decreasing function in gross emissions or, equivalently, in capital. Abatement
expenditures are equal to zero in the region below and on this function and,
consequently, consumption and current expenditure are the same. Thus, if
e · E (g),t h e n®(e;g)=0 ,o t h e r w i s e ,®(e;g) > 0 .
For e>E(g), the optimal amount for abatement expenditures is im-
































(P) > 0. That is, optimal abatement is an increasing
function of current expenditure and gross emissions and we can state the
following.
Proposition 1 If current expenditure is small enough it would be optimal
to spend no resources on abating pollution. However, if marginal damage
is an increasing function of gross emissions and marginal bene…ts decrease
as consumption increases, there is a critical value for current expenditure,
e = E (g), from which welfare increases by allocating resources to abate
emissions. Then, abatement expenditures can be de…ned as an increasing
function in current expenditure and gross emissions.




[e ¡ ®(e;g)] > 0;v g = ¡D
0
[g ¡ R(®(e;g))] < 0;
vee = B
00
[e ¡ ®(e;g)](1 ¡ ®e) < 0;v eg = ¡B
00










Let m(e;g) be the marginal willingness to pay for a reduction in pollution
de…ned as the marginal damage of gross emissions in terms of the marginal









Given our assumptions about the technology for abating emissions, the
marginal willingness to pay for a reduction in damage is an increasing func-
























Consider now the optimal accumulation problem. This is the classical
problem of allocating resources to consumption that provides utility by itself
and investment that a¤ords future consumption. In this model the trade-
o¤ involves investment and current expenditure, instead of consumption.
Therefore, the optimal accumulation problem consists of choosing time paths
for capital and current expenditure in order to maximise the present value








k = F (k) ¡ ±k ¡ e; k(0) = k0 ¸ 0:
13The Maximum Principle de…nes two …rst-order di¤erential equations, one
in the state, k, and another in the costate variable, ¹, and the requirement
that the Hamiltonian is maximised with respect to the control variable at
every point in time.
ve = ¹; (12)
F
0






k = F (k) ¡ ±k ¡ e: (14)
It can be inferred from (12) that it is optimal to accumulate capital to the
point in which its shadow price equals the increment of welfare provided by
the last unit of current expenditure. Condition (13) is the familiar Ramsey
equation that states that the marginal revenue product of capital must be
equal to the interest rate (pure rate of discount, plus rate of depreciation of
capital, plus rate of decline of the marginal utility of current expenditure).
Notice, however, that the price of capital is corrected by a Pigouvian tax to
re‡ect the marginal damage being generated by output. This tax should be
equal to the amount of emissions per unit of output, µ, multiplied by the
marginal willingness to reduce damage, m. Finally, (14) is the equation of
motion for the state variable.
As we are dealing with an in…nite horizon ‘autonomous’ problem, the
transversality condition needed to provide a boundary condition can be re-
placed by the assumption that the optimal solution approaches a steady
state.6 Thus, the steady state levels of current expenditure and capital,
6As Kamien and Schwartz (1991) point out, this is a quite reasonable assumption since
one might expect that, in the long run, the optimal solution would tend to ‘settle down’
as the environment is stationary by hypothesis.
14(e¤;k¤), will be given by the intersection between a concave and a decreas-
ing function of capital.
e¤ = F (k¤) ¡ ±k¤; (15)
F
0
(k¤)f1 ¡ µm[e¤;µF(k¤)]g = ± + ½: (16)
A necessary and su¢cient condition that guarantees the existence of a
unique steady state is that 1 ¡ µm > 0: That is, according to (10), equa-
tion (16) provides a unique solution if and only if the marginal product
of abatement is smaller than µ. This means that if there is no technology
for abating pollution and emissions are controlled by reducing production,
that is, R
0
(a)=µ, the steady state is not well de…ned. Thus, we will as-
sume that R
0
(a) >µ . Then, 0 < 1 ¡ µm < 1 and condition (16) implies
that the stock of capital at the steady state is smaller than the one of the
Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model.
Regarding the transition to the steady state, (13) and (14) de…ne the
evolution of the costate and state variables, respectively. We can also obtain
the equation of motion for the control variable by di¤erentiating completely
(12) with respect to time. Taking into account (13), the locus of points









[F (k¤) ¡ ±k¤ ¡ e¤]+1¡ µm[e¤;µF(k¤)]
¾
= ½ + ±: (17)
Notice that (15), (16) and (17) intersect at the point (e¤;k¤) and that
the curve (17) is ‡atter than (16), as long as the additional term in (17) is
positive (negative) under (above) the locus
:
k =0 .
15Therefore, as Selden and Song (1995) prove, pollution control results in
a smaller stock of capital at the steady state. We also get a phase diagram
de…ned by both a concave and a negative sloped function. Nevertheless,
in this case, the negative sloped line refers to the locus of points at which
current expenditure, instead of consumption, is constant.
De…ne the system of motion for capital and current expenditure as:
:











[F (k) ¡ ±k ¡ e]
+1 ¡ µm(e;µF (k)) ¡ (½ + ±)g:
The behaviour of this non-linear system can be analysed by the study of
the approximating linear di¤erential equation system in the neighbourhood
of the steady state (see appendix) and it is possible to conclude that:
Proposition 2 Current expenditure and capital increase along their time
path to the steady state. Moreover, pollution control results in a smaller
stock of capital at the steady state.
In conclusion, small levels of income or, alternatively, capital are related
with no abatement control. However, once countries reach a given level
of development they are better of by caring about environmental quality.
Moreover, the marginal willingness to pay for reducing the damage generated
by pollution increases with current expenditure and capital. Thus, as current
expenditure and capital increase along the time path to the steady state,
abatement e¤orts also increase. Therefore, previous propositions de…ne a J








Figure 1: Steady state and stable path for current expenditure and capital.
Finally, it could be interesting to see how changes in the parameters ½ and








¤ ; where ¤=F
00











Di¤erentiating (15) we check that de¤=dk¤ = F
0
(:)¡ ±>07 and dg¤=dk¤ =
µF
0
(:) > 0: Hence, the steady state stock of capital depends negatively on
both parameters.
Moreover, as we stated in the …rst proposition, expenditure on abate-
ment is an increasing function in current expenditure and gross emissions.
Thus, since the steady state stock of capital is negatively related to ½ and µ
and current expenditure and gross emissions increase with the stock of cap-
ital, abatement expenditures increase as these parameters decrease. How-
7From (16) we have that F
0
(k






17ever, it is not possible to infer the e¤ects of these changes on consump-
tion without de…ning particular functions. Notice that net pollution could
either increase or decrease as far as gross emissions and abatement ex-











(a)®ede:8 Therefore, the optimal allocation
rule of current expenditure de…ned by the …rst order conditions (2) and (3)
are not enough to infer the e¤ects of changes in ½ and µ on consumption.
When current expenditure and abatement decrease, consumption can either
increase, if the decrease in current expenditure is smaller than the decrease
in abatement expenditure, or, otherwise, decrease. Nevertheless, we could
expect that a smaller stock of capital due to a higher rate of discount were
the result of devoting more resources to consumption. On the contrary, the
decrease in the stock of capital resulting from an increase in µ could be the
consequence of higher expenditures on pollution control. These results are
summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 3 T h es m a l l e rt h er a t eo fd i s c o u n ta n d / o rt h el e s sp o l l u t i n g
the technology used to produce …nal goods and capital is, the higher the steady
state levels of capital, current expenditure and abatement will be.
Graphically, the locus (15) does not depend on parameters ½ and µ,
however, (16) and (17) move on the right as either ½ or µ decreases.
4A t w o - c o u n t r y m o d e l .
Pollution is usually a global or transboundary problem involving interactions
between countries. This section considers two countries to check whether













18these interactions a¤ect the relationship between air pollution and income.
In the acid rain case, for instance, winds transport a percentage, ¾i,o f
pollutants emitted by each country, Pi = gi¡Ri (ai), to its neighbour. Thus,
the ‡ow of emissions in country i will be Ãi [gi ¡ Ri (ai)] + ¾i [gj ¡ Rj (aj)],
where Ãi =1¡ ¾i:9
In this context, as Barret (1990) points out, the marginal abatement cost
for each country depends on its own abatement level, while each country´s
marginal abatement bene…t depends on world-wide abatement. However,
as the externalities are reciprocal, every country has some incentive to take
unilateral actions even in the absence of agreement. The di¤erence between
the global net bene…ts for the cooperative and non-cooperative outcomes
de…nes the potential gains to cooperation.
Suppose that preferences, technologies and natural environments are ex-
actly the same in both countries.
4.1 Cooperative equilibrium.
Each country chooses the optimal values for the control variables taking
into account the damage due to its emissions of pollutants on both its own
welfare and that of its neighbour. Thus, the optimisation problem can be
formulated as if a social planner maximised the sum of welfare of both
countries. Once again, the optimisation problem will be decomposed into
two stages: environmental and investment decisions.
The optimal amount of abatement expenditure is implicitly de…ned by
the following condition:10
9Once again, we are ignoring the amount of acid absorbed by the natural environment,
otherwise, we would have that Ãi + ¾i · 1:
10Notice that for ¾ =0 , that is, if pollution is a local problem, this equation is exactly
19B
0






















j (:) < 0;8i;j =1 ;2;i6=
j, the willingness to pay for abating pollution is:
mc











The optimal solution to the accumulation problem must satisfy the fol-
lowing conditions:










ki = Fi (ki) ¡ ±iki ¡ ei; (22)
8 i;j =1 ;2 such that i 6= j: Hence, the steady state levels of current
expenditure and capital are given by equations:
ec







i (ei;g i;e j;g j)] = ½i + ±i: (24)
4.2 Noncooperative equilibrium.
Consider now that countries do not cooperate and each government chooses
time paths for abatement and capital in order to maximise the present dis-
t h es a m ea s( 9 ) .
20counted value of pro…ts for an in…nite time horizon, taken the time path of
the other country net emissions, Pj = gj ¡ R(aj),a sg i v e n .
The necessary and su¢cient condition that the amount of abatement
expenditures must satisfy to maximise welfare is:
B
0
i (ei ¡ ai) ¸ ÃiD
0
i [Ãi (gi ¡ Ri (ai)) + ¾iPj]R
0
i (ai);a i ¸ 0: (25)
An interior solution, ai = ®ol
i (ei;g i;P j); to the optimal abatement prob-




















¢ > 0;d a i=daj = ¡R
0



















i (:) > 0: That is,
the optimal level of abatement expenditures increases with current expen-
diture and pollution and countries have incentives to free ride on the abate-
ment e¤orts of their neighbour. Moreover, as viei = B
0
i (:) > 0 and vigi =
¡ÃiD
0
i (:) < 0;the marginal willingness to pay for abating pollution can be
de…ned as:
mol












i (ei;g i;P j)
¤ > 0: (26)
By comparing the cooperative and noncooperative solutions we see that
condition (18) has an additional term regarding condition (25). As long as
this additional term is positive, and given the properties of the functions,
for a given level of current expenditure and net emissions from the other
country, the amount of abatement expenditures that satis…es (18) must be
higher than the one that satis…es (25).
These results can be summarised as follows:
21Proposition 4 When pollution is a global problem it is also optimal to
spend no resources on abating emissions for small levels of current expen-
diture. However, there is a critical value, ei = Ei (gi;P j),f r o mw h i c hw e l -
fare improves by allocating resources to abatement. This critical value is
smaller for the cooperative solution. Furthermore, the optimal level of ex-
penditures on abatement can be de…ned as an increasing function of pollution
and current expenditure. Moreover, for each level of current expenditure and
pollution, optimal abatement expenditures are larger in the cooperative equi-
librium.















i (ei;g i;P j)
i






ki = Fi (ki) ¡ ±iki ¡ ei: (29)


















i (ei;g i;P j)
i
= ½i + ±i: (31)
Notice that as mc
i (:) >m ol







in (31) must be smaller than F
0
i (kc
i) in (24) and, consequently, the locus
22:
e =0de…ned by (24) for the cooperative solution is on the left of the locus
de…ned by (31) for the noncooperative equilibrium. Then we can conclude
that:
















Figure 2: Steady state. Cooperative equilibrium versus non-cooperative
equilibrium
Furthermore, changes in the rate of discount, ½i, and/or the technology
used to produce …nal goods and capital, de…ned by the parameter µi,w i l l
a¤ect the steady state levels of capital and current expenditure.













































Moreover, dei=dki = F
0
i (:)¡±i > 0, dgi=dki = µiF
0











dgi=dki < 0:11 Accordingly, an increase in the
stock of capital increases the marginal willingness to pay for abating pol-
lution by increasing current expenditure and gross emissions. Neverthe-
less, as the reaction functions for abatement expenditures have a negative
slope, a higher steady state stock of capital for country i will increase the
level of abatement expenditures of country j and, as a result, net pollu-
tion Pj will decrease. Notice, however, that miPj =( ¾i=Ãi)migi <m igi
12
and jdPj=dkij < jdgi=dkij because ¾j=Ãj < 1, ®jgjR
0
j (:) < 1 and 0 <
1¡®igiR
0
i (:) < 1: Thus, di¤erences in the rate of discount and/or the tech-
nology used to produce …nal goods and capital could explain asymmetries
in the e¤orts to abate emissions and we can state the following.
Proposition 6 T h ec o u n t r yw i t ht h es m a l l e s tt e m p o r a lr a t eo fd i s c o u n t
and/or the less polluting technology will be characterized by the highest steady
state levels of capital, current expenditure and abatement.
5 Conclusions.
This paper has proposed an alternative framework to Selden and Song’s
(1995) work. It has focused on the e¤ects of emissions of some pollutants on
the steady state levels and time paths for current expenditure, consumption
11Notice that 0 < 1 ¡ R
0
i (:)®igi < 1 for i =1 ;2:
12If we make the reasonable assumption that Ãi >¾ i:
24plus abatement expenditures, and capital. Pollution has been regarded as
a negative externality that arises as a non-planned output of the economic
process.
It has been shown that for low levels of current expenditure and capital
it is optimal to care exclusively about economic growth and postpone clean-
ing activities. However, once a certain level of income is reached, welfare
increases by reallocating resources to pollution control. Expenditures on
abatement have been proved to be an increasing function of gross emissions
and current expenditure. Moreover, current expenditure and capital in-
crease along the time path to the steady state and, consequently, abatement
expenditures also increase with income. Therefore, a J curve for abatement
has been replicated by the proposed model. A static comparative analysis
has con…rmed that the smaller the rate of discount and/or the less pollut-
ing a technology is, the higher the steady state stock of capital will be; in
the …rst case probably because of a higher level of consumption and in the
second one as a consequence of greater e¤orts to abate emissions.
Additionally, pollution has been dealt as a transboundary problem by
considering a simple model involving two countries. The lack of cooperation
has been proved to result in smaller e¤orts to abate emissions along the time
path to the steady state, characterized by larger levels of current expenditure
and capital. Finally, it has been shown that di¤erences in the rate of discount
and the technology used to produce …nal goods and capital could explain
di¤erent e¤orts to abate pollution across countries.
Nevertheless, an important interaction between countries like trade has
not been addressed. Moreover, the model presented is an exogenous growth
model and a more appropriate analysis should also include the computation
of feedback strategies.
25A Stability Analysis.
The local stability of the steady state can be inferred from the Jacobian
matrix of the non-linear system evaluated at the steady state.
jJ¤j =












(k¤) ¡ ±>0;f ¤



































Let x1 and x2 be the solutions to the characteristic equation. A well

























Hence, one root will be positive and the other negative and, consequently,
the steady state will be saddle point stable. Equation (14) states that above
:
k =0the stock of capital decreases whereas it increases under that line.
Likewise, equation (13) establishes that on the right-hand side of
:
¹ =0 ,t h e
shadow price of capital, ¹; increases, whereas it decreases on the left-hand
side.
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